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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BULK TELEPHONE 
METADATA: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CASE LAW 
STEVEN G. STRANSKY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 2, 2015, the President signed into law the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline 
Over Monitoring Act of 2015,1 which is also known as the “USA FREEDOM 
Act.”2 The law effectively ended the U.S. government’s ability to utilize 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT3 to collect telephone metadata4 in 
bulk from telecommunication service providers for foreign intelligence 
purposes.5 On the same day that he signed the USA FREEDOM Act into law, 
the President issued a statement providing that the law “will strengthen civil 
liberty safeguards and provide greater public confidence in [the U.S. 
 
* LL.M., National Security Law, Georgetown University Law School; J.D., the University of 
Akron, C. Blake McDowell Law Center; B.A., The Ohio State University. The author serves as 
an Attorney-Advisory at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The author would like to 
thank the editors and staff on the Saint Louis University Public Law Review for assisting in the 
publication of this article. The views and misjudgments contained herein belong entirely to the 
author. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). The Bill passed in the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 388-88 and in the Senate by a vote of 67-32. See H.R. 2048, 114th 
Congress (2015), available at www.congress.gov. 
 2. Judge Mosman described the law’s title as “another example of the tail of a catchy 
nickname wagging the dog of a Rube Goldberg official title.” In re Application, Docket No. BR 
15-75, at *1, n.1 (FISC Ct. June 29, 2015), redacted opinion available at https://www.eff.org/ 
files/2015/07/01/fisa_court_opinion_-_june_29_2015.pdf. 
 3. P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
 4. The term “metadata” refers to a set of data or information that describes and gives 
information about other data, and does not include the content of communications. NAT’L. INFO. 
SHARING ORG., UNDERSTANDING METADATA 1 (2004), http://www.niso.org/publications/press/ 
UnderstandingMetadata.pdf. (Understanding Metadata is a revision and expansion of Metadata 
Made Simpler: a guide for libraries published by NISO Press in 2001.) 
 5. See OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STATEMENT BY THE 
[DEP’T OF JUSTICE] AND THE [OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE] ON THE 
DECLASSIFICATION OF THE RESUMPTION OF COLLECTION UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT (June 30, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint–statement–department–justice 
–and–office–director–national–intelligence–declassificati–0 (noting that “[t]he USA FREEDOM 
Act of 2015 banned bulk collection under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act . . .”). 
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government’s telephone metadata programs,] including by prohibiting bulk 
collection through the use of Section 215 . . . and by providing the American 
people with additional transparency measures.”6 
In addition to its distinct statutory amendments limiting the government’s 
ability to collect telephone metadata, the USA FREEDOM ACT will 
significantly impact on-going litigation concerning the constitutionality of the 
U.S. government’s bulk telephone metadata collection program. Specifically, 
after certain provisions of the USA FREEDOM ACT go into effect after 180 
days of its enactment,7 the courts will most likely dismiss such litigation on the 
grounds that that the U.S. government does not have the statutory authority to 
continue to collect telephone metadata in bulk and the cases will therefore be 
viewed as moot.8 According to one commentator, a case pending in the D.C. 
District Court regarding the government’s collection program “will be moot in 
November when the USA Freedom Act goes into effect.”9 In fact, even prior to 
the law’s passage, “[l]egal scholars” were indicating that “at least three of six 
major lawsuits against the program likely would be doomed” if the USA 
FREEDOM Act becomes law, which was troubling to some activists who were 
relying on these cases to “brand” the government’s activities as 
unconstitutional.10 According to Professor Douglas Laycock, “[i]t’s pretty 
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would hear one of these cases after a 
statute makes them moot.”11 
Prior to the USA FREEDOM Act becoming law, however, judges from 
across the federal judicial system examined whether the U.S. government’s 
collection of bulk telephone metadata was restricted or otherwise impacted by 
 
 6. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Statement by the President on 
the USA FREEDOM Act (June 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/ 
02/statement-president-usa-freedom-act. 
 7. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, 
No. BR 15-75, at *1 (holding that the USA FREEDOM Act “deliberately carved out a 180-day 
period following the date of enactment” in which the U.S. government was authorized to continue 
to use FISA to collect telephone metadata in bulk). 
 8. See generally Steven Nelson, Freedom Act May Kill Lawsuits That Seek Major Privacy 
Ruling, US NEWS & WORLD REP., (May 13, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/arti 
cles/2015/05/13/freedom–act–may–kill–lawsuits–that–seek–major–privacy–ruling. 
 9. Benjamin Wittes, Standing Confusion in Obama v. Klayman, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2015, 
5:33 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/standing–confusion–obama–v–klayman. 
 10. Nelson, supra note 8. 
 11. Steven Nelson, Freedom Act’s Advance Threatens NSA Court Cases, US NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Nov. 14, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/14/free 
dom-acts-advance-threatens-nsa-court-cases (quoting Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of 
Virginia Law School). But see, David Greene, Appeals Court Sends Smith v. Obama NSA 
Lawsuit Back to the Trial Court, Electronic Frontier Foundation, (Mar. 24, 2016) (noting that 
certain litigation regarding the U.S. government’s metadata collection program may continue to 
resolve claims for “money damages”). 
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the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and this article consolidates 
those opinions.12 In analyzing this constitutional issue, the courts primarily 
focused on the extent to which the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. 
Maryland13 was applicable to the U.S. government’s metadata collection 
efforts and whether the concurring opinions in its more recent decision of U.S. 
v. Jones14 provided a new framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment 
matters.15 However, given the unlikelihood that the courts will continue to 
accommodate lawsuits regarding the government’s (soon to be) obsolete 
metadata collection program, the case law consolidated herein may provide the 
only judicial guidance regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
and Smith and Jones with regard to bulk telephone metadata.16 Thus, to the 
extent the U.S. government is seeking to establish a new national security 
program involving the bulk collection of telephone metadata, whether through 
a separate statutory scheme or through Presidential directive, the cases 
described infra provide the most recent direction and guidance on these Fourth 
Amendment principles.17 In other words, although there is a plethora of 
academic discussions related to the constitutionality of the bulk telephone 
metadata program, the cases described herein are significant because they 
represent the only judicial scrutiny on this very narrow topic.18 
 
 12. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 18, 2013); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); In re 
Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). Several courts and 
commentators have argued that collection of bulk telephone metadata is not authorized by Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT; however, because this article focuses on the judicial decisions 
regarding the constitutionality of the program, it will only infrequently discuss these statutory 
arguments. 
 13. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 14. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 15. EDWARD C. LIU, ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43459, OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO NSA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 5–6 (2015) (stating that the resolution of this 
constitutional issue “turns, in large part, on the applicability of the 1979 case Smith v. Maryland 
to the bulk collection program and the persuasiveness of more recent Supreme Court discussions 
about the effect of new technologies and prolonged government surveillance on the privacy 
interests of Americans.”). 
 16. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Jones, 132 U.S. at 945. See also Part IV infra. 
 17. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Jones, 132 U.S. at 945. 
 18. For opposing viewpoints from academia related to the constitutionality of the bulk data 
collection program, compare Randy E. Barnett, Commentary, The NSA’s Surveillance Is 
Unconstitutional, THE WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2013, 6:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100 
014, with Orin S. Kerr, Metadata, the NSA, and the Fourth Amendment: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Collecting and Querying Call Records Databases, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 
17, 2013, 3:54 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/07/17/metadata-the-nsa-and-the-fourth-amendment-
a-constitutional-analysis-of-collecting-and-querying-call-records-databases/. 
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This article is segregated into five parts. Part II provides a brief overview 
of the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection program. Part III 
examines the scope of the Fourth Amendment and emphasizes certain judicial 
precedent and principles that are discussed by the case law described in Part 
IV; Part III also describes the executive branch’s interpretation and application 
of this Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV, in turn, discusses the recent 
case law examining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the U.S. 
collection of telephone metadata. As will be described in greater detail below, 
four separate district courts have ruled directly on this issue and in three of the 
cases the courts rejected the challenges to the government’s collection 
activities and held that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Smith supports the 
conclusion that the U.S. government’s collection of telephone metadata in bulk 
is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.19 This issue has been discussed (to 
varying degrees) by two circuit courts, one of which provided, in dicta, that the 
collection of such data raises “serious” constitutional concerns.20 On the other 
hand, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)21 has routinely held 
that this collection activity is consistent with the Fourth Amendment and, in 
reaching its conclusions, the FISC has addressed the opposing arguments and 
conclusions reached by the aforementioned district and circuit courts.22 
II.  BACKGROUND: SECTION 215 AND BULK TELEPHONE METADATA 
On August 9, 2013, the Obama Administration drafted a “White Paper” 
that provided, inter alia, an overview of its bulk telephone metadata collection 
program it conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT.23 
 
 19. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 18, 2013); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 
2014); In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 20. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015); Obama v. Klayman, No. 14-5004 
(D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 21. See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA), Pub. 95–
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801–1885c). The FISC is an eleven-judge court that 
may approve requests from the Attorney General for warrants to authorize the U.S. government to 
undertake certain surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Id. 
 22. See Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518; see also Klayman, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d; Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d; Smith, 24 F. Supp. 3d; In re Application, No. BR 13–109, 
2013 WL 5741573; Clapper, 785 F.3d; Klayman, No. 14-5004. 
 23. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA 
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Aug. 9, 2013) [hereinafter, “White Paper”], 
https://www.eff.org/document/administration–white–paper–section–215–patriot–act. See 
generally Ellen Nakashima & Robert Barnes, Obama Administration Asserts Broad Surveillance 
Powers, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/oba 
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Therein, the Administration states that “[d]etecting threats by exploiting 
terrorist communications has been, and continues to be, one of the critical 
tools” in the U.S. government’s efforts to combat terrorism, and “[i]t is 
imperative that [the U.S. government] have the capability to rapidly identify 
any terrorist threat inside the United States.”24 “One important method that the 
Government has developed to accomplish this task,” according to the White 
Paper, “is analysis of metadata associated with telephone calls within, to, or 
from the United States.”25 Not surprisingly, the Director of National 
Intelligence provided similar comments during congressional testimony as he 
noted that Section 215 provides an “important tool” in detecting and 
preventing terrorist attacks.26 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT authorizes the FISC to issue a 
court order for the “production of any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain 
foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to 
protect against international terrorism,” so long as the investigation of a United 
States person is not “conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the 
first amendment to the Constitution.”27 The White Paper states that pursuant to 
Section 215, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would obtain FISC 
orders directing telecommunication service providers to give the National 
Security Agency (NSA) their business records that contain certain 
telecommunications metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and the date, 
time, and duration of a call.28 The court orders generated by the FISC do not 
authorize the NSA to “listen to” or “record” any telephone calls as part of this 
program.29 Because the telecommunication entities “are directed to supply 
virtually all of their calling records to the NSA, the [FISC’s] orders result in 
 
ma–administration–asserts–broad–surveillance–powers/2013/08/09/ff429504–0134–11e3–96a8–
d3b921c0924a_story.html. 
 24. White Paper, supra note 23, at 2. 
 25. White Paper, supra note 23, at 2. 
 26. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 
29, 2014) (statement for the record from James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). 
 27. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1), (c). 
 28. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that FISC production orders “do not allow the 
Government to collect the content of any telephone call, or the names, addresses, or financial 
information of any party to a call” or “cell phone locational information” (emphasis in original)). 
But see THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 27 (Jan. 23, 2014) (“Some 
information obtained by the NSA under Section 215 could nevertheless provide a general 
indication of a caller’s geographic location. For instance, the area code and prefix of a landline 
telephone number can indicate the general area from which a call is sent.”). 
 29. White Paper, supra note 23, at 1. 
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the production of call detail records for a large volume of telephone 
communications.”30 Approximately every ninety days, the FBI files a new 
application with the FISC requesting that telecommunication service providers 
be ordered to continue providing this metadata to the NSA for another ninety 
days.31 
The NSA retains and queries this bulk metadata for counterterrorism 
purposes, which the White Paper described as follows: 
Under the FISC orders authorizing the collection, authorized queries may only 
begin with an “identifier,” such as a telephone number, that is associated with 
one of the foreign terrorist organizations that was previously identified to and 
approved by the Court. An identifier used to commence a query of the data is 
referred to as a “seed.” Specifically, under Court-approved rules applicable to 
the program, there must be a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed 
identifier used to query the data for foreign intelligence purposes is associated 
with a particular foreign terrorist organization . . . 
Information responsive to an authorized query could include, among other 
things, telephone numbers that have been in contact with the terrorist-
associated number used to query the data, plus the dates, times, and durations 
of the calls. Under the FISC’s order, the NSA may also obtain information 
concerning second and third-tier contacts of the identifier (also referred to as 
“hops”). The first “hop” refers to the set of numbers directly in contact with 
the seed identifier. The second “hop” refers to the set of numbers found to be 
in direct contact with the first “hop” numbers, and the third “hop” refers to the 
set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the second “hop” numbers. 
Following the trail in this fashion allows focused inquiries on numbers of 
interest, thus potentially revealing a contact at the second or third “hop” from 
the seed telephone number that connects to a different terrorist-associated 
telephone number already known to the analyst. Thus, the order allows the 
NSA to retrieve information as many as three “hops” from the initial identifier. 
Even so, under this process, only a tiny fraction of the bulk telephony metadata 
records stored at NSA are authorized to be seen by an NSA intelligence 
analyst, and only under carefully controlled circumstances.32 
 
 30. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 22. 
 31. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 27. When the 
FISC approves an application for an order requesting metadata, it issues a “primary order” 
outlining the scope of data that each telecommunication entity must provide the NSA and the 
restrictions on how the government can query and disseminate said data. THE PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 23. Separately, the FISC produces a 
“secondary order” addressed to the telecommunication entity directing it to comply with those 
terms and conditions. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 
23. 
 32. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3–4. See also Exec. Order No. 12333, 40 Fed. Reg. 
59,941, 59,949 (Dec. 4, 1981) (describing the limitations on the ability for Intelligence 
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In addition to how the NSA queries this metadata, the White Paper 
discusses how this data was retained and disseminated.33 Specifically, it 
provides that the “[r]esults of authorized queries are stored and are available 
only to those analysts trained in the restrictions on the handling and 
dissemination of the metadata” and “[q]uery results” are further analyzed “only 
for valid foreign intelligence purposes.”34 The NSA may “provide leads” to the 
FBI or other Intelligence Community elements; however, for U.S. persons, the 
NSA may only provide such leads for counterterrorism investigations.35 In 
turn, “[i]f the FBI investigates a telephone number or other identifier tipped to 
it through this program, [it] must rely on publicly available information, other 
available intelligence, or other legal processes,” such as a court order 
subpoena, “in order to identify the subscribers of any of the numbers that are 
retrieved.”36 
The White Paper identifies procedural safeguards related to the retention, 
querying, and dissemination of this metadata.37 For example, it provides that 
“[t]echnical controls preclude NSA analysts from seeing any metadata unless it 
is the result of a query using an approved identifier,” and “when the seed 
identifier is reasonably believed to be used by a U.S. person, the suspicion of 
an association with a particular foreign terrorist organization cannot be based 
solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.”38 In addition, it 
provides that NSA analysts must “apply the minimization and dissemination 
requirements and procedures specifically set out in the FISC’s orders before 
query results, in any form, [can be] disseminated outside of the NSA.”39 Unless 
the metadata is identified thought the aforementioned query process, the NSA 
 
Community elements, such as the NSA, to collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning 
“U.S. persons,” as the term is defined therein). 
 33. See White Paper, supra note 23. 
 34. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4. 
 35. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4. 
 36. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that if, through further investigation, the FBI 
“develop[ed] probable cause to believe that a number in the United States was being used by an 
agent of a foreign terrorist organization,” it could then “apply to the FISC for an order . . . to 
authorize interception of the contents of future communications to and from that telephone 
number.”). 
 37. See White Paper, supra note 23. 
 38. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3. According to the White Paper, the “reasonable, 
articulable suspicion” standard “protects against the indiscriminate querying of the collected 
data.” White Paper, supra note 23, at 3. However, “[a]s used in other contexts, [reasonable, 
articulable suspicion] is a less stringent standard than the “probable cause” standard that is 
required to be satisfied for criminal search warrants or traditional electronic surveillance under 
FISA.” LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. 
 39. White Paper, supra note 23, at 3; see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (defining the term 
“minimization procedures”). 
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must delete the information “no later than five years after the agency receives 
[it].”40 
The White Paper notes that “although a large amount of metadata is 
consolidated and preserved by the Government, the vast majority of that 
information is never seen by any person” and that “[o]nly information 
responsive to the limited queries that are authorized for counterterrorism 
purposes is extracted and reviewed by analysts.”41 This sentiment is echoed by 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which provided the following: 
“[g]enerally, the telephony metadata program has operated by placing few 
limits on the government’s ability to collect and retain large amounts of 
domestic and international telephone records while imposing more stringent 
restrictions on the government’s capacity to search or make further use of the 
collected metadata.”42 “These restrictions,” according to the CRS “are not 
explicitly required by the statutory text of Section 215,” but “[i]nstead . . . are 
delineated as part of the orders the FISC issues pursuant to Section 215.”43 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Recent case law analyzing the government’s ability to collect and retain 
bulk telephone metadata for foreign intelligence purposes has primarily 
focused on the scope of the Fourth Amendment and the third party doctrine, as 
enumerated in Smith.44 Accordingly, this section provides background 
information on the Fourth Amendment’s legal framework and how it has been 
interpreted by the Executive Branch. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides, 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”45 
The Fourth Amendment’s applicability to a particular circumstance depends on 
whether “the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a 
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by 
 
 40. THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 28, at 25. See also 
White Paper, supra note 23, at 3. 
 41. White Paper, supra note 23, at 4. According to the Administration, “[a]lthough the 
number of unique identifiers has varied substantially over the years, in 2012, fewer than 300 met 
the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard and were used as seeds to query the data after 
meeting the standard.” White Paper, supra note 23, at 4. 
 42. LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
 43. LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. 
 44. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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government action.”46 In other words, the Fourth Amendment protection 
applies only if (1) a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in 
the place searched, and (2) that expectation, viewed objectively, is justified 
under the circumstances.47 In determining whether an individual may have a 
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court has 
routinely relied upon the third party doctrine, which refers to “[t]he principle 
that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that one has 
voluntarily disclosed to one or more third parties.”48 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court analyzed the third party doctrine 
in the context of metadata disclosed to telephone companies during the course 
of routine telephone calls, and, as noted above, all the cases discussed infra 
focus on the extent to which Smith is applicable in the bulk telephone metadata 
context.49 The Smith case focused on whether the government could request, 
without a warrant, that a telephone company install a pen register to record the 
numbers dialed from the telephone at a criminal suspect’s residence and use 
the information derived therefrom in a criminal prosecution.50 The Court ruled 
that the numerical information conveyed to the phone company during a 
routine telephone call, such as the telephone number dialed, is not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
such information.51 The Supreme Court stated that “[t]elephone users . . . 
typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone 
company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; 
and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety 
of legitimate business purposes.”52 
Accordingly, the Court found that telephone subscribers do not “harbor 
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”53 The 
Supreme Court held that “even if petitioner did harbor some subjective 
expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this 
 
 46. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
 47. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 48. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
443 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent “the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information 
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed”). 
 49. See LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5–6 . 
 50. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 51. Id. at 739–46. According to the Court, the “petitioner in all probability entertained no 
actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his 
expectation was not ‘legitimate.’ The installation and use of a pen register, consequently, was not 
a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.” Id. at 745–46. 
 52. Id. at 743; see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 561, 577-78 (2009). 
 53. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. 
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expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”54 
The Court reiterated that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”55 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones needs to be 
discussed herein because of the manner in which it has been incorporated or 
rejected by the court decisions described infra.56 In Jones, law enforcement 
officers attached, without a warrant, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device 
to the defendant’s vehicle and tracked his location for twenty-eight days.57 The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from this 
surveillance on the grounds that the government’s actions violated protections 
afforded to him under the Fourth Amendment.58 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address this issue and Justice Scalia, writing on behalf of the 
majority, concluded that the law enforcement officers’ conduct constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment because the information at issue was 
obtained by means of a physical intrusion on the defendant’s vehicle, which is 
a constitutionally-protected area.59 
Two concurring opinions in Jones, however, raised concerns with relying 
upon precedent for analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy in the context 
of the government’s ability to collect information on a person through the use 
of advanced technological systems.60 Specifically, in her concurring opinion, 
Justice Sotomayor questioned the relevancy of Smith in analyzing the 
constitutionality of bulk data collections, and provided the following passage, 
which garnered special attention in the cases described below: 
“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
 
 54. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 55. Id. at 743–44; see also United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
“data about [a telephone] ‘call origination, length, and time of call’ . . . is nothing more than pen 
register and trap and trace data, [in which] there is no Fourth Amendment ‘expectation of 
privacy’”) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44); see also Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 296 
n.27 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44). 
 56. See LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5–6. 
 57. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948; see generally Robert Barnes, Supreme Court 
Limits Police Use of GPS Tracking, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/supreme-court-warrants-needed-in-gps-tracking/2012/01/23/gIQAx7qGLQ_ 
story.html. 
 58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 59. Id. at 949, 953. According to Justice Scalia, “[i]t is important to be clear about what 
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. at 
949. 
 60. Id. at 955. 
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people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in 
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers 
that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the 
e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online 
retailers . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to 
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”61 
According to Professor Miriam Baer, “in fewer than ten paragraphs, Justice 
Sotomayor questions and reframes two of the oldest and most criticized 
doctrines in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,” but “[c]ommendably, 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion stops short of creating the drastic change in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”62 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito, provided the following guidance 
with regard to the novel issues associated with using modern, non-intrusive 
surveillance techniques: “the best that [the Court] can do in this case is to 
apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS 
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable 
person would not have anticipated.”63 “Under this approach,” according to 
Justice Alito, “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on 
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable.”64 However, Justice Alito concluded by noting that 
“the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy” and that “[f]or such offenses, society’s 
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and 
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”65 It is 
important to note that in contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion does not reference the third party doctrine, the 
Smith case, or government efforts related to the collection or retention of bulk 
telephone metadata.66 
A. Executive Branch Interpretation and Application 
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the primary responsibility of the Attorney 
General “has been to advise the President and the heads of the executive 
 
 61. Id. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 62. Miriam H. Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and Workable Rules: Justice Sotomayor Stakes Out 
the Middle Ground in United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. F. 393 (2014). 
 63. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 957. 
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departments on legal matters,”67 and the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) has 
been “delegated virtually all of the Attorney General’s contemporary opinion 
writing.”68 The OLC itself has stated that it is responsible for providing 
“authoritative legal advice to the President and all the Executive Branch 
agencies,”69 and the courts have recognized that OLC-issued opinions are, 
except under certain circumstances, “binding as a matter of law” on the 
Executive Branch.70 The OLC has previously put forth formal guidance 
regarding how the Fourth Amendment impacts (1) the government’s collection 
of telephone metadata and (2) intelligence community collection activities, in 
general.71 In order to better understand the government’s position in the 
judicial case described infra, these two issues will be described here. 
First, regarding the collection of telephone metadata, the OLC has 
consistently held that, in accordance with Smith, an individual does not possess 
a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
provided to telephone companies during the course of routine telephone calls.72 
The OLC relied on this precedent and legal reasoning when interpreting 
whether an individual has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation 
in bulk metadata provided to third parties.73 Specifically, the OLC has stated, 
 
 67. Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary 
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 337 (1993); see 28 U.S.C § 511 (“The Attorney General 
shall give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President.”); id. §511 
(“The head of an executive department may require the opinion of the Attorney General on 
questions of law arising in the administration of his department.”). 
 68. Kmiec, supra note 67, at 337; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (enumerating the functions of 
the OLC). 
 69. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, About the Office, www.justice. 
gov/olc. 
 70. See Public Citizen v. Burke, 655 F. Supp. 318, 321–22 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that with 
limited exception, “an Attorney General’s opinion is binding as a matter of law on those who 
request it until withdrawn by the Attorney General or overruled by the courts.”). 
 71. See e.g. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Legal Issues Relating to the Testing, 
Use, and Deployment of an Intrusion–Detection System (EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect Unclassified 
Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009). 
 72. See e.g. id, at 6 (providing that, in accordance with Smith, there is “no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information transmitted to 
telephone companies”); Transmission by a Wireless Carrier of Information Regarding Cellular 
Phone User’s Physical Location to Public Safety Organizations, 20 Op. O.L.C. 315, 319 n.17 
(1996) (noting that the “Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person has no expectation of 
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” such as in telephone numbers 
dialed”); Fourth Amendment Implication of Military Use of Forward Looking Infrared Radars 
Technology for Civilian Law Enforcement, 16 Op. O.L.C. 41, 45 n.17 (1992) (affirming that 
Smith held “the installation and use of a pen register to record telephone numbers . . . was not a 
search, although the pen register revealed to police telephone numbers that [the defendant] dialed 
within the privacy of his own home”). 
 73. See e.g. Bradbury, supra note 71, at 12. 
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“[a]s for metadata collection . . . we conclude that under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in [Smith], the interception of the routing information for both 
telephone calls and e-mails does not implicate any Fourth Amendment 
interests.”74 
These historical OLC memoranda are consistent with the current 
Administration’s interpretation of this issue, which was summarized in the 
White Paper as follows: 
“Although the telephony metadata obtained through Section 215’[s] [bulk 
telephone metadata collection program] includes, in addition to the numbers 
dialed, the length and time of the calls and other similar dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information, under the reasoning adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Smith, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
information, which is routinely collected by telecommunications service 
providers for billing and fraud detection purposes. Under longstanding 
Supreme Court precedent, this conclusion holds even if there is an 
understanding that the third party will treat the information as confidential. 
Nothing in [Jones] changed that understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”75 
The Obama Administration has argued that the “scope” of the U.S. 
government’s telephone metadata collection program “does not alter the 
conclusion that the collection of telephony metadata under a Section 215 court 
order is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”76 “Collection of telephony 
metadata in bulk from telecommunications service providers under the 
program,” according to the Administration, “does not involve searching the 
property of persons making telephone calls. And the volume of records does 
not convert that activity into a search.”77 
Second, the OLC has repeatedly held that even if U.S. intelligence 
community activities impact an individual’s constitutionally protected right to 
privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not always require the government to 
obtain a warrant in order to effectuate these efforts.78 For instance, in 2006, the 
 
 74. Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN., REVIEW 
OF THE LEGALITY OF THE STELLAR WIND PROGRAM 101 (May 6, 2004) [hereinafter, 
“STELLAR WIND”], redacted memorandum www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attach 
ments/2014/09/19/may_6_2004_goldsmith_opinion.pdf. 
 75. White Paper, supra note 23, at 20. 
 76. White Paper, supra note 23, at 20. 
 77. White Paper, supra note 23, at 20. 
 78. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the 
President, 30 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 8 (2006) [hereinafter Legal Authorities] (“[T]he President has 
inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance within the 
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.”); see also STELLAR WIND, supra note 74, at 
37–43 (arguing that even in peacetime, absent congressional action, the President has inherent 
constitutional authority, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, to order warrantless foreign 
intelligence surveillance). 
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OLC provided the following assessment related to the Fourth Amendment and 
U.S. intelligence community activities: 
“The touchstone for review of government action under the Fourth 
Amendment is whether the search is “reasonable” . . . [A]ll of the federal 
courts of appeals to have addressed the issue have affirmed the President’s 
inherent constitutional authority to collect foreign intelligence without a 
warrant . . . . Properly understood, foreign intelligence collection in general . . . 
fit[s] within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the mere fact that no warrant is secured 
prior to the surveillance at issue in the NSA activities does not suffice to render 
the activities unreasonable.”79 
The OLC has stated that in determining whether a government activity is 
reasonable within the context of a Fourth Amendment analysis, one must 
undertake a “general balancing approach, ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”80 This OLC interpretation has been reinforced by the current 
Administration.81 
IV.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TELEPHONE METADATA: RECENT CASE 
LAW 
In recent years, four district courts, one circuit court, and several FISCs 
have addressed – to varying degrees – whether the U.S. government’s 
collection and retention of bulk telephone metadata for foreign intelligence 
purposes is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.82 This portion of the 
memorandum describes the legal analysis, reasoning, and conclusions reached 
by these separate courts on this discrete issue. 
 
 79. Legal Authorities, supra note 78, at 33; see also STELLAR WIND, supra note 74, at 
37–43 (providing a substantially similar legal analysis). 
 80. Legal Authorities, supra note 78, at 33. 
 81. See White Paper, supra note 23, at 21. 
 82. See generally United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); see 
also ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Smith v. Obama, 24 
F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); see also In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring 
the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. 
Aug. 29, 2013); see also In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. October 11, 2013), www.aclu. 
org/files/assets/2013.10.11_fisa_court_memorandum.pdf; see also In re Application of F.B.I. for 
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01 (FISA Ct. March 20, 
2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1148929/opinion-and-order-in-case.pdf; see 
also In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
No. BR 15-75 (FISC Ct. June 29, 2015). 
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A. District Court Decisions 
As noted, four separate district courts have ruled directly on the 
aforementioned issue related to the bulk collection of telephone metadata and 
in three of the cases the courts have indicated that the third party doctrine, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Smith, is applicable to the U.S. 
government’s collection activities therein.83 In contrast, only one district court 
opinion distinguished bulk collection of telephone metadata from the Court’s 
decision in Smith, and indicated that such information most likely is protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.84 
1. United States v. Moalin 
In U.S. v. Moalin,85 the U.S. government alleged that the defendants 
conspired to and provided certain types of material support to terrorists and 
terrorist organizations in violation of law.86 Prior to trial, the defendants sought 
to suppress wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a FISC warrant on the 
grounds that the collection of such information violated, inter alia, the Fourth 
Amendment.87 The court denied the defendants’ request to suppress such 
evidence, and, after seventeen days of trial and deliberations, the jury found the 
defendants guilty on all counts alleged in the U.S. government’s indictment.88 
After the trial, the news media reported on the existence of several classified 
surveillance programs conducted by the U.S. government, which included the 
Section 215 program and other programs used to gather information on the 
defendants.89 Consequently, the defendants filed a motion for a new trial on the 
basis that the Fourth Amendment protects the telephone metadata provided to 
their telecommunication providers, and the U.S. government’s collection of 
such information in bulk violated their constitutional rights.90 Thus, in 
reviewing this motion, the court addressed whether the defendants had any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in certain telephone metadata.91 At the time 
the motion for a new trial was filed with the court, one commentator opined, 
 
 83. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 84. See Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *1. 
 87. Id. at *1, *5. 
 88. Id. at 2–3; see also Press Release, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Three Somali 
Immigrants Sentenced for Providing Support to Foreign Terrorists (Nov. 18, 2013). 
 89. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 at *3. 
 90. Id. at *5. 
 91. Id. 
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“if it proves successful, . . . [it will] break the NSA’s dragnet phone 
surveillance program.”92 
Judge Miller, writing the opinion of the district court, began his Fourth 
Amendment analysis by reiterating the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith that 
“someone who uses a telephone has ‘voluntarily conveyed numerical 
information to the telephone company and exposed that information to its 
equipment in the ordinary course of business,’ and therefore has ‘assumed the 
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.’”93 The 
Judge then noted that the defendants were requesting the court to ignore 
precedent, including the Smith decision, and to “blaze a new path and adopt the 
approach to the concept of privacy set forth by Justice Sotomayor in her 
concurrence in [Jones].”94 
Judge Miller provided, “Justice Sotomayor stated that the recent rise of the 
digital era of cell phones, internet, and email communications may ultimately 
require a reevaluation of ‘expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.’”95 The “defendants extrapolate from this dicta,” 
according to Judge Miller, “that the court should recognize that defendant 
Moalin had a reasonable expectation of privacy cognizable under the Fourth 
Amendment that the Government would not collect either individual or 
aggregated metadata.”96 However, the district court rejected this argument and 
provided the following: 
“[P]en register-like devices predate the internet era by about 150 years and are 
not a product of the so-called digital revolution-the basis for the concerns 
articulated by Justice Sotomayor. Second, and more importantly, the Supreme 
Court specifically and unequivocally held in Smith that retrieval of data from a 
pen register by the Government without a search warrant is not a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. Because individuals voluntarily convey 
numerical information to the telephone company to complete a telephone call, 
one cannot possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone 
number dialed (as opposed to the content of the conversation).”97 
 
 92. Sean Vitka, The Dragnet’s Day in Court, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2013, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/09/basaaly_moalin_s_defense_team_
takes_on_ass_nsa_telephone_surveillance.html. 
 93. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 at *6 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 744). 
 94. Id. at *7. 
 95. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also LIU ET AL., supra note 15, at 8 (noting that the 
Moalin court rejected the Defendant’s motion for a new trial, and in doing so, “observ[ed] that the 
use of pen registers, which the Supreme Court upheld in Smith, have pre-dated the digital 
revolution by about 150 years, negating the argument that the Jones concurrences’ discussion of 
new technologies compelled a different result”). 
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Judge Miller stated that “when defendant Moalin used his telephone to 
communicate with third parties, whether in Somalia or the United States, he 
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed.98 
The calls were routed through the communications company and its switching 
equipment in the ordinary course of business.”99 According to the Judge 
Miller, “[w]hile defendant Moalin may have had some degree of a subjective 
expectation of privacy, that expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.’”100 Judge Miller concluded his opinion by 
referencing similar holdings promulgated by the FISC,101 which will be 
discussed in more detail infra. 
2. Klayman v. Obama 
In Klayman v. Obama,102 subscribers to certain telecommunications and 
Internet services brought actions against the U.S. government and private 
service providers alleging, inter alia, that the government’s bulk collection of 
telephone metadata violated the Fourth Amendment.103 The subscribers moved 
for a preliminary injunction to prevent the U.S. government from continuing to 
engage in the bulk collection and querying of telephone record metadata, and 
to require the government to destroy any such metadata in its possession.104 In 
analyzing whether to grant the preliminary injunction, the district court 
undertook a legal analysis wherein it considered, inter alia, whether the 
plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, including 
(germane to the issue herein) whether they are likely to succeed on their Fourth 
Amendment claim.105 
Ultimately, based on the following rational, the district court found that 
Smith was not binding precedent in the context of the Klayman case and that 
“bulk telephony metadata collection and analysis almost certainly does violate 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”106 First, Judge Leon, writing on behalf of 
district court, distinguished the type of bulk data collection undertaken by the 
government in its case from the facts in Smith on the basis that the records used 
by the government in Smith were considered “short-term” and “forward-
looking” and the government’s collection efforts in Klayman involved the 
 
 98. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 at *7. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12, (1978)). 
 101. Id. at *8 (“The FISC has similarly determined that individuals like Defendant Moalin 
cannot successfully assert a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim to telephony metadata.”). 
 102. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded to Obama 
v. Klayman, No. 14–5004 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 103. Id. at 7. 
 104. Id. at 7–8. 
 105. Id. at 25–43. 
 106. Id. at 32. 
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“creation and maintenance of a historical database containing five years’ worth 
of data.”107 Second, Judge Leon found that the “relationship between the police 
and the phone company in Smith is nothing compared to the relationship that 
has apparently evolved over the last seven years between the Government and 
telecom companies,” which itself raises Fourth Amendment concerns because 
of the “formalized policy under which the service provider collects information 
for law enforcement purposes.”108 
Third, Judge Leon referred to the U.S. government’s technological 
capability to store and analyze bulk telephone metadata as “almost-Orwellian” 
and noted that it is “unlike anything” previously reviewed by the courts.109 
Thereafter, Judge Leon quoted Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones and 
stated that this technology is “‘cheap in comparison to conventional 
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously,’ thereby 
‘evad[ing] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement 
practices: limited police . . . resources and community hostility.”110 Finally, 
Judge Leon focused on the fact that “[c]ell phones have also morphed into 
multi-purpose devices,”111 and argued that “most importantly, not only is the 
Government's ability to collect, store, and analyze phone data greater now than 
it was in 1979, but the nature and quantity of the information contained in 
people’s telephony metadata is much greater, as well.”112 Thereafter, Judge 
Leon again quoted Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones and held 
that “[the] rapid and monumental shift towards a cell phone-centric culture 
means that the metadata from each person’s phone ‘reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,’ 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33 (emphasis in original). Judge Leon stated, “[i]t’s one 
thing to say that people expect phone companies to occasionally provide information to law 
enforcement; it is quite another to suggest that our citizens expect all phone companies to operate 
what is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering operation with the Government.” Id. at 33; see 
also, Paul Rosenzweig, The Lynchpin of the Meta-Data Opinion, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2013) 
(“Judge Leon dismisses Smith v. Maryland (a case that the FISC considered controlling) on the 
ground that . . . well . . . it’s old.”). 
 109. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33. 
 110. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)). 
 111. Id. at 34. But see Orin S. Kerr, Preliminary Thoughts on Judge Leon’s Opinion, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 16, 2013, 6:45 PM) (emphasis in original) http://volokh.com/2013/12/16/pre 
liminary–thoughts–judge–leons–opinion/ (arguing that it does not matter “that today’s phones are 
combined in a single device with other functions” because the government’s collection program 
is “not collecting information about the use of those other functions” and “[i]t is only collecting 
the same information that was collected in Smith v. Maryland: Information about numbers dialed 
using the device’s telephone functionality and when the call was made”). 
 112. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (emphasis in original). 
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that could not have been gleaned from a data collection in 1979.”113 “[T]hese 
trends,” according to the Judge, “have resulted in a greater expectation of 
privacy and a recognition that society views that expectation as reasonable.”114 
Judge Leon concluded his Fourth Amendment analysis with the following: 
“Plaintiffs have alleged that they engage in conduct that exhibits a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the bulk, five-year historical record of their telephony 
metadata, and I have no reason to question the genuineness of those subjective 
beliefs. The more difficult question, however, is whether their expectation of 
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable 
and justifiable . . . [T]he question that I will ultimately have to answer when I 
reach the merits of this case someday is whether people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy that is violated when the Government, without any basis 
whatsoever to suspect them of any wrongdoing, collects and stores for five 
years their telephony metadata for purposes of subjecting it to high-tech 
querying and analysis without any case-by-case judicial approval. For the 
many reasons set forth above, it is significantly likely that on that day, I will 
answer that question in plaintiffs’ favor.”115 
According to one commentator, Judge Leon made a “powerful case” for 
distinguishing the U.S. government’s bulk telephone metadata program from 
its collection activities as issue in Smith.116 
After determining that the U.S. government’s collection of telephone 
metadata in bulk is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
Judge Leon turned next to whether the search was “reasonable.”117 He began 
his analysis by stating the well-established principle that warrantless searches 
by the government are per se unreasonable in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment.118 Judge Leon recognized, but did not endorse, the U.S. 
government’s argument that the “special needs” exception applies to the facts 
presented, and held that in order to reach a decision on the matter he must 
“balance” the privacy expectations of the plaintiff against the interests of the 
U.S. government “to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or 
some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”119 
 
 113. Id. at 36 (quoting Jones 132 S. Ct. at 955) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see generally 
Adam Serwer, How Sotomayor Undermined Obama’s NSA, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 23, 2013, 5:43 
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how–sotomayor–undermined–obamas–nsa. 
 114. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (emphasis in original). 
 115. Id. at 37. 
 116. Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on Judge Leon’s Section 215 Opinion, LAWFARE (Dec. 17, 
2013, 10:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts–judge–leons–section–215–opinion. 
 117. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 29–31. 
 118. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37–38; see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) 
(“To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”). 
 119. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–34, 
(2002)); see also Legal Authorities, supra note 78, at 33 (discussing the “special needs” exception 
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Specifically, Judge Leon analyzed (1) the nature of the privacy interest 
allegedly compromised by the U.S. government’s search, (2) the character of 
the intrusion imposed on the plaintiffs by the government, and (3) the nature 
and immediacy of the U.S. government’s concerns and the efficacy of the 
government’s collection activities in meeting them.120 
In analyzing the first two criteria, Judge Leon held that because of the 
reasons described above, the plaintiffs have a “significant expectation of 
privacy in an aggregated collection of their telephony metadata covering the 
last five years, and the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Program significantly 
intrudes on that expectation.”121 In examining the last criteria, Judge Leon 
stated that “[g]iven the . . . utter lack of evidence that a terrorist attack has ever 
been prevented because searching the NSA database was faster than other 
investigative tactics—I have serious doubts about the efficacy of the metadata 
collection program . . . ”122 Judge Leon concluded by noting that the “plaintiffs 
have a substantial likelihood of showing that their privacy interests outweigh 
the Government’s interest in collecting and analyzing bulk telephony metadata 
and therefore the NSA’s bulk collection program is indeed an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.”123 According to Professor Orin Kerr, 
Judge Leon’s opinion in Klayman, “[g]ives opponents of the NSA program 
more fuel to add to the fire, but its legal impact is quite limited because the 
case now just goes to the court of appeals,”124 which was vacated and 
remanded by the appellate court primarily because the plaintiffs failed to 
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on the issue of 
standing.125 
 
to the Fourth Amendment in the context of U.S intelligence community activities); see also 
STELLAR WIND, supra note 74, at 33. 
 120. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
 121. Id. at 39. 
 122. Id. at 40–41; but see THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Remarks by 
President Obama and German Chancellor Merkel in Joint Press Conference (June 19, 2013, 
12:46 p.m.), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-
and-german-chancellor-merkel-joint-press-confere (noting that because of the U.S. government’s 
surveillance programs, “at least 50 threats . . . have been averted”). 
 123. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
 124. Ellen Nakashima & Ann E. Marimow, Judge: NSA’s Collecting of Phone Records is 
Probably Unconstitutional, Wash. Post (Dec. 16, 2013) (quoting Orin S. Kerr), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/national/judge–nsas–collecting–of–phone–records–is–likely–unconstitutional/20 
13/12/16/6e098eda–6688–11e3–a0b9–249bbb34602c_story.html. 
 125. Klayman, 800 F. 3d at 561-64. 
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3. American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper 
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper,126 the plaintiffs brought a 
legal action seeking a declaratory judgment that the NSA’s bulk telephony 
metadata collection program violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment.127 
The plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction enjoining the U.S. 
government from continuing the collection, and, in response, the government 
moved to dismiss the case.128 
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment issue, Judge Pauley III, writing on 
behalf of the district court, reaffirmed the “bedrock holding” articulated in 
Smith that an “individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information provided to third parties.”129 Judge Pauley III then continued his 
opinion to address and then dismiss the plaintiff’s argument that protections 
enumerated within the Fourth Amendment apply to bulk telephone metadata 
provided to and maintained by telecommunication service providers.130 
According to Judge Pauley III, “the business records created by Verizon are 
not ‘plaintiffs’ call records,’” as argued by the Plaintiffs, but are records 
created and maintained by the telecommunications provider, and “[u]nder the 
Constitution, that distinction is critical because when a person voluntarily 
conveys information to a third party, he forfeits his right to privacy in the 
information.”131 Additionally, “the Government’s subsequent querying of the 
telephony metadata does not implicate the Fourth Amendment—anymore than 
a law enforcement officer’s query of the FBI’s fingerprint or DNA databases to 
identify someone.”132 “The collection of breathtaking amounts of information 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment,” according to Judge Pauley III, “does 
not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.”133 
 
 126. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) rev’d on other grounds; ACLU 
v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015) (vacating the district court’s rulings on statutory ground, 
and only briefly discussed the Constitutional issues ruled on by the district court). 
 127. Id. at 730; see generally Adam Liptak and Michael S. Schmidt, Judge Upholds N.S.A.’s 
Bulk Collection of Data on Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/ 
28/us/nsa–phone–surveillance–is–lawful–federal–judge–rules.html; see generally Bob Van Voris, 
NSA Call Data Sweep Ruled Legal as Court Conflict Brews, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Dec. 28, 
2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013–12–27/nsa–call–data–pro 
gram–ruled–lawful–by–u–s–judge. 
 128. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
 129. Id. at 749 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
 130. Id. at 749–52. 
 131. Id. at 751. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 752; see also White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (“Collection of telephony metadata 
in bulk from telecommunications service providers under the program does not involve searching 
the property of persons making telephone calls. And the volume of records does not convert that 
activity into a search.”). 
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In additional, Judge Pauley III critiqued the plaintiff’s reliance on Judge 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones in formulating their argument: 
The ACLU’s reliance on the concurring opinions in Jones is misplaced. In 
Jones, the police attached a GPS tracking device to the undercarriage of a 
vehicle without a warrant and tracked the vehicle’s location for the next four 
weeks. The majority held that a “search” occurred because by placing the GPS 
device on the vehicle, “[t]he Government physically occupied private property 
for the purpose of obtaining information . . . [S]uch a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when it was adopted.” In two separate concurring opinions, five justices 
appeared to be grappling with how the Fourth Amendment applies to 
technological advances. 
But the Supreme Court did not overrule Smith. And the Supreme Court has 
instructed lower courts not to predict whether it would overrule a precedent 
even if its reasoning has been supplanted by later cases . . . Clear precedent 
applies because Smith held that a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in telephony metadata created by third parties. Inferior courts are 
bound by that precedent.134 
Thereafter, Judge Pauley III addressed Judge Leon’s opinion in 
Klayman,135 which, according to the Judge, focused on the “the ubiquity of 
cellular telephones” and how the relationships between telephone users and 
telecommunication providers “have evolved since Smith.”136 However, 
according to Judge Pauley III, this relationship “has not changed and is just as 
frustrating.”137 Further, the Judge found that it is immaterial to the Fourth 
Amendment that telephones are more “versatile now than when Smith was 
decided,” because the underlying issue is still focused on the non-
communications content aspect of telephone calls.138 “The fact that there are 
more calls placed,” said Judge Pauley III, “does not undermine the Supreme 
 
 134. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (internal citations omitted); see Peter Margulies, Judge 
Pauley’s Opinion in Clapper: Reset Button for Bulk Collection Debate? LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 
2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judge–pauleys–opinion–clapper–reset–button–
bulk–collection–debate (stating that in Judge Pauley III’s view, the warrant requirement, as 
articulated in Jones, for “planting a GPS device” on a car “does not discredit the third-party 
doctrine” and “Jones . . . merely requires a heightened standard for the physical, more 
comprehensive intrusion connoted by the surveillance in that case, which has none of the 
elements of consent that drive the third-party doctrine”). 
 135. Liptak & Schmidt, supra note 127 (quoting Orin S. Kerr). According to Professor Kerr, 
the opinions written by Judge Pauley III and Judge Leon are “the exact opposite . . . in every way, 
substantively and rhetorically.” Id. 
 136. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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Court’s finding that a person has no subjective expectation of privacy in 
telephony metadata.”139 
Last, Judge Pauley III quoted the Klayman decision when concluding his 
own Fourth Amendment analysis: “[i]mportantly, ‘what metadata is has not 
changed over time,’ and ‘[a]s in Smith, the types of information at issue in this 
case are relatively limited: [tele]phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the 
like.”140 According to Judge Pauley III, “[b]ecause Smith controls, the NSA’s 
bulk telephony metadata collection program does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”141 Professor Margulies stated that judge Pauley’s opinion “is a 
welcome corrective to the anti-metadata clamor triggered by Judge Leon’s 
Klayman opinion” and it “deflates the overblown arguments made by metadata 
critics on the program’s efficacy, the quality of judicial and congressional 
oversight, and the continued vitality of the Supreme Court’s precedent in Smith 
v. Maryland.”142 However, as will be discussed infra, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals overturned this decision, but did so based upon statutory grounds 
and only addressed the Fourth Amendment issues in dicta.143 
4. Smith v. Obama 
Similar to the facts discussed in the previous two cases, in Smith v. 
Obama144 the plaintiff brought an action against the U.S. government wherein 
she sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the NSA from collecting her 
cellular telephone records and call data.145 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged 
that the collection activity violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure.146 In response to the plaintiff’s motion 
(and as could be expected), the U.S. government sought to dismiss the case.147 
Chief Judge Winmill, writing for the district court, analyzed the 
government’s activity within the context of the Fourth Amendment and first 
reiterated the Smith decision and found that the plaintiff “has no expectation of 
 
 139. Id. See also Kerr, supra note 111 (arguing that the change in cell phone use and 
technology does not alter the underlying conclusions in Smith). 
 140. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (quoting Klayman, 957 F.Supp.2d at 35) (emphasis in 
original). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Margulies, supra note 134. 
 143. Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1006–07. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Another Federal Judge Rules on Legality of NSA 
Surveillance, WASH. POST (June 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh–con 
spiracy/wp/2014/06/03/another–federal–judge–rules–on–legality–of–nsa–surveillance/; Steven 
Nelson, Nurse’s NSA Lawsuit Gains Firepower, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/16/idaho–nurses–nsa–lawsuit–gains–firepower–
from–aclu–eff. 
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privacy in the telephone numbers that she dials” and “[a] person using the 
telephone ‘voluntarily convey[s] numerical information to the telephone 
company’ and ‘assume[s] the risk that the company [will] reveal to police the 
numbers he dialed.’”148 Thereafter, Chief Judge Winmill posed a hypothetical 
question to himself: “the data collected by the NSA reaches into [plaintiff’s] 
personal information [and] the NSA’s collection of the time and duration of 
phone calls is revealing: Would most citizens want to keep private the fact that 
they called someone at one in the morning and talked for an hour or two?”149 
The Chief Judge went a step further and indicated that the “intrusion” the 
Supreme Court addressed within Smith – law enforcement surveillance of 
telephone numbers dialed from a criminal suspect for two days – represents a 
“looming gulf” with the intrusion in the current case,150 which he described as 
the U.S. government collecting and storing the telephone metadata of U.S. 
citizens for five years151 that results in a “vast trove of data” within the U.S. 
government’s possession.152 Yet, in response to the concerns he raised, the 
Chief Judge noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently 
found that telephone and email metadata and other similar information does 
not receive Fourth Amendment protection153 and that two other district courts – 
Moalin and Clapper – have applied Smith to find that the U.S. government’s 
bulk telephone metadata program does not violate the Fourth Amendment.154 
Next, the Chief Judge addressed Judge Leon’s contrary holding in 
Klayman, which he described as a “thoughtful and well-written decision.”155 
Chief Judge Winmill provided the following summary of the Klayman 
decision: 
[Judge Leon] distinguished Smith by finding that the scope and duration of the 
NSA’s collection is far beyond the individual pen register at issue in Smith. Of 
critical importance to Judge Leon was that Smith could never have anticipated 
the ubiquity of cell-phones and the fact that “people in 2013 have an entirely 
different relationship with phones than they did thirty-four years ago.” As he 
eloquently observes, “[r]ecords that once would have revealed a few scattered 
tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire mosaic—a vibrant and 
 
 148. Smith, 24 F.Supp. 3d at 1007 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)). 
 149. Id. at 1007–08. 
 150. Id. at 1008. 
 151. Id. at 1006–07. 
 152. Id. at 1007. 
 153. Id. at 1008 (citing United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009)); United 
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Golden Valley Elec. 
Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 154. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1005; see generally Devlin Barrett, Idaho Judge Asks Supreme 
Court to End NSA’s Phone Surveillance, WALL ST. J (June 3, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/idaho-judge-suggests-supreme-court-end-nsa-phone-surveillance-1401824175. 
 155. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1009. 
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constantly updating picture of the person’s life.” Ultimately, he held that the 
plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on their Fourth Amendment claim, and he 
enjoined the NSA from collecting their telephone records . . . .156 
The Chief Judge believes that “Judge Leon’s decision should serve as a 
template for a Supreme Court opinion.”157 Yet, regardless of his admiration for 
Judge Leon’s opinion in Klayman, Chief Judge Winmill found that “Smith was 
not overruled, and it continues . . . to bind this Court” and thus “constrains 
[him] from joining Klayman.”158 Accordingly, the district court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.159 Professor Kerr summarized the opinion as 
follows: “Judge Winmill concludes that the NSA program complies with the 
Fourth Amendment as a matter of precedent, but . . . expresses the view that 
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court should change their precedent so as to 
deem the NSA program unconstitutional.”160 
B. The Circuit Court Decisions 
There have been only two circuit courts – the Second Circuit and the 
District of Columbia Circuit – that have addressed or otherwise discussed 
whether the U.S. government’s collection of bulk telephone metadata for 
foreign intelligence purposes is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.161 The 
Second Circuit’s decision primarily focused on statutory matters, but addressed 
the aforementioned issue in dicta.162 On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit 
opinion focused on whether the plaintiffs have standing and the thresholds for 
a preliminary injunction; the D.C. Circuit only mentioned the Fourth 
Amendment issue in passing.163 Accordingly, only the Second Circuit opinion 
will be discussed herein. 
1. The Second Circuit: American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper 
As noted above, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the U.S. 
government’s collection of bulk telephone metadata in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, [and stated in dicta] that the aforementioned government 
 
 156. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1010. 
 159. Id. at 1010. 
 160. Kerr, supra note 147. 
 161. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d. 787, 825 (2nd Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)561–64 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 162. See Clapper, 785 F.3d. at 825. 
 163. Klayman, 800 F.3d at 561–64 (“The preliminary injunction entered by the district court 
is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.”). 
See generally Wittes, supra note 9 (discussing the Klayman ruling on the issue of standing). 
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activity raises “serious” constitutional concerns.164 Specifically, on September 
2, 2014, the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal from the plaintiffs–appellants 
wherein they argued that Judge Pauley III, in the decision discussed supra, 
erroneously dismissed their case.165 At the circuit court, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the bulk telephone metadata collection program conducted by the U.S. 
government was not authorized by statute and violated the Fourth 
Amendment.166 Judge Lynch, writing on behalf of the Second Circuit, based 
his decision solely on the former: “[b]ecause we find that the [NSA] program 
exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized, we vacate the decision 
below dismissing the complaint without reaching appellants’ constitutional 
arguments.”167 
However, although Judge Lynch did not use the Fourth Amendment as a 
basis for his ruling, he did discuss Fourth Amendment concerns at length in 
dicta.168 Judge Lynch framed the competing constitutional arguments between 
the parties as follows: 
The government argues, and the district court held, that [the third party] 
doctrine requires rejection of appellants’ claim that the acquisition of telephone 
metadata (as opposed to the contents of communications) violates the Fourth 
Amendment, or even implicates its protections at all. Appellants respond that 
modern technology requires re-visitation of the underpinnings of the third-
party records doctrine as applied to telephone metadata.169 
According to Judge Lynch, this “touches an issue on which the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence is in some turmoil.”170 Thereafter, he reiterated the 
holding in Smith related to the third patty doctrine and telephone metadata, but 
provided the following observation: 
Metadata today, as applied to individual telephone subscribers, particularly 
with relation to mobile phone services and when collected on an ongoing basis 
 
 164. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 808; see generally Pete Williams, Federal Appeals Court Says NSA 
Phone Records Program Illegal, NBC NEWS (May 7, 2015, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/20 
15/05/07/federal-appeals-court-says-nsa-phone-records-program-illegal-dj.html; Mark Rodgers, 
2nd Circuit Finds NSA’s Bulk Metadata Program Not Authorized By Patriot Act, LEXISNEXIS 
(May 7, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/technology/b/cyber-risk-
privacy/archive/2015/05/07/second-circuit-finds-nsa-s-bulk-metadata-program-not-authorized-
by-patriot-act.aspx. 
 165. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792. But see Peter Margulies, Clapper and the Costs of 
Overlooking Use Restrictions, LAWFARE (May 14, 2015, 2:55 PM), https://www.lawfareblog. 
com/clapper-and-costs-overlooking-use-restrictions (discussing some of the “flaws” in the 
Second Circuit’s decision). 
 166. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792, 799. 
 167. Id. at 792. 
 168. Id. at 822–25. 
 169. Id. at 822. 
 170. Id. at 821; Rodgers, supra note 164 (briefly discussing the constitutional issues raised in 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Clapper). 
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with respect to all of an individual’s calls (and not merely, as in traditional 
criminal investigations, for a limited period connected to the investigation of a 
particular crime), permit something akin to the 24–hour surveillance that 
worried some of the Court in Jones. Moreover, the bulk collection of data as to 
essentially the entire population of the United States, something inconceivable 
before the advent of high-speed computers, permits the development of a 
government database with a potential for invasions of privacy unimaginable in 
the past. Thus, appellants argue, the program cannot simply be sustained on the 
reasoning that permits the government to obtain, for a limited period of time as 
applied to persons suspected of wrongdoing, a simple record of the phone 
numbers contained in their service providers’ billing records.171 
Judge Lynch concluded his opinion by noting that the court does not need 
to resolve the “weighty constitutional issues” present in this case, but that 
“[t]he seriousness of the constitutional concerns” described in the court’s 
opinion “has some bearing on what we hold today, and on the consequences of 
that holding.”172 
C. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Decisions 
As noted above, the FISC has routinely addressed the issue of whether 
bulk metadata collection implicates the Fourth Amendment, although these 
opinions are not, at least generally speaking, available to the general public.173 
Chief Judge Pauley III noted in his 2013 decision described infra that “[f]ifteen 
different FISC judges have found the metadata collection program lawful a 
total of thirty-five times since May 2006.”174 Additionally, in ruling upon 
whether bulk telephone metadata is protected within the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment, recent FISC decisions have addressed the opposing arguments 
raised by Judge Leon in Klayman and by the Second Circuit in Clapper.175 
This portion of the article highlights four of these publicly available FISC 
decisions, each of which analyzed the Fourth Amendment in the context of the 
U.S. government’s ability to collect bulk telephone metadata. 
1. In re Application (August 2013 Opinion) 
The genesis of In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted],176 
can be traced to an application submitted by the FBI on July 18, 2013 to the 
 
 171. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 824. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1) (2015) (authorizing FISC judges to issue ex parte orders 
approving the release of tangible things). 
 174. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 756. 
 175. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 176. Id. at *1. 
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FISC for an order pursuant to 50 U.S.C § 1861, which required the ongoing 
daily production to the NSA of certain telephone metadata.177 The FISC “held 
an extensive hearing to receive testimony and evidence on this matter,” which 
was conducted ex parte under security procedures mandated by law;178 the 
court approved the application on July 19, 2013.179 As noted by the 
Washington Post, the August 2013 opinion “is the first to be released [to the 
general public] that addresses the constitutionality of the NSA’s ‘bulk records’ 
collection of phone data,” [and was] an attempt by the U.S. government to 
“address growing criticism about [its] broad surveillance [program] . . . .”180 
During its review of the government’s FISA application, the FISC 
analyzed whether the Fourth Amendment “imposed any impediment” to the 
government’s proposal to collect bulk telephone metadata.181 Judge Eagan, 
writing on behalf of the FISC, noted that the government’s collection of 
telephone service provider metadata is “squarely controlled” by Smith and its 
progeny.182 According to the FISC Judge, “[t]he Supreme Court in Smith 
recognized that telephone companies maintain call detail records in the normal 
course of business for a variety of purposes”183 and “‘[t]elephone users . . . 
typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone 
company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; 
and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety 
of legitimate business purposes.’”184 Thus, “once a person has transmitted this 
information to a third party (in this case, a telephone company), the person ‘has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in [the] information,’”185 and when the 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; see 50 U.S.C § 1803 (2015) (mandating that FISC proceedings “be maintained under 
security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and 
the Director of National Intelligence”); see also Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, 
to Patrick J. Leahy, Commissioner, Senate Judiciary Committee (July 29, 2013), http://www.lea 
hy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Honorable%20Patrick%20J%20Leahy.pdf (describing some of the 
security measures implemented by the FISC). 
 179. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *1. 
 180. Ellen Nakashima, FISA Court Releases Opinion Upholding NSA Phone Program, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fisa-
court-releases-opinion-upholding-nsa-phone-program/2013/09/17/66660718-1fd3-11e3-b7d1-715 
3ad47b549_story.html. 
 181. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *1. 
 182. Id. at *2; see generally Benjamin Wittes & Jane Chong, Congress Has No Clothes: A 
Quick and Dirty Summary of the New FISC Opinion, LAWFARE (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:03 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-has-no-clothes-quick-and-dirty-summary-new-fisc-
opinion (noting that Judge Eagan put forth a “strong” legal opinion). 
 183. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *2 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 
(1979)). 
 184. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743). 
 185. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743). 
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government obtains this telephone metadata from the telephone company, it is 
not conducting a “search,” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.186 
Judge Eagan considered the factual distinctions between Smith and more 
recent requests by the U.S. government to collect telephone metadata in 
bulk.187 She recognized that Smith focused on the government’s ability to 
obtain “the telephone company’s metadata of one person suspected of a crime” 
and the current case focused on the government’s request for the “daily 
production of certain telephony metadata in bulk belonging to companies 
without specifying the particular number of an individual.”188 Judge Eagan 
cited a similar (but redacted) legal analysis that the FISC had previously 
undertaken, and noted that “the application of the Fourth Amendment depends 
on the government’s intruding into some individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy [and] Fourth Amendment rights are personal and individual.”189 Thus, 
“[s]o long as no individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in meta 
data, the large number of persons whose communications will be subjected to 
the . . . surveillance is irrelevant to the issue of whether a Fourth Amendment 
search or seizure will occur.”190 
Judge Eagan reinforced her legal analysis by stating, “where one individual 
does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping together a large number 
of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest 
springing into existence ex nihilo.”191 In other words, “Judge Eagan concludes 
that if metadata does not implicate an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in his telephony metadata, neither does the bulk collection of metadata 
about numerous persons.”192 
In concluding her opinion, Judge Eagan stated that because the U.S. 
government’s application only concerns the production of telephony metadata 
that was collected and retained by a telecommunications provider – and not the 
contents of communications – the Smith decision “compels the conclusion that 
there is no Fourth Amendment impediment to the collection.”193 According to 
the Judge, “this Court finds that the volume of records being acquired does not 
 
 186. Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 746); see generally Orin S. Kerr, My (Mostly Critical) 
Thoughts on the August 2013 FISC Opinion on Section 215, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 
2013, 7:39 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/09/17/thoughts-august-2013-fisc-opinion-section-215/ 
(briefly noting support for Judge Eagan’s Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 187. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *2–3. 
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. See also White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (addressing whether the volume of records 
impacts the Fourth Amendment analysis regarding bulk telephone metadata). 
 191. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *2. 
 192. Wittes & Chong, supra note 182. 
 193. In re Application, WL 5741573 at *3. 
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alter this conclusion” and “there is no legal basis for this Court to find 
otherwise.”194 
2. In re Application (October 2013 Opinion) 
On October 11, 2013, Judge McLaughlin of the FISC granted the FBI’s 
application to renew the order discussed in the aforementioned August 2014 
FISC ruling.195 She issued a memorandum that both adopted Judge Eagan’s 
conclusions regarding the Fourth Amendment and provided additional 
reasoning that supported her argument that the production of bulk telephone 
metadata does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.196 Judge McLaughlin 
began her Fourth Amendment analysis by noting that she “agrees with Judge 
Eagan that, under [Smith], the production of call detail records in this matter 
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.”197 Judge 
McLaughlin found that the Supreme Court “stressed” in Smith that the U.S. 
government’s use of a pen register to record the numbers dialed from the 
defendant’s home telephone did not constitute a “search” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment because “the information acquired did not include 
the contents of any communication and that the information was acquired by 
the government from the telephone company, to which the defendant had 
voluntarily disclosed it for the purpose of completing his calls.”198 
According to the New York Times, “Judge Eagan’s opinion,” discussed 
infra “has been criticized, in part, because she made no mention of a landmark 
privacy case decided by the Supreme Court in 2012,”199 and, in contrast Judge 
McLaughlin specifically addressed the Jones decision and found that it “does 
not point to a different result here.”200 More specifically, Judge McLaughlin 
reiterated the holding in Jones and stated the majority opinion of the Court 
“declined to decide whether use of the GPS device, without the physical 
intrusion, impinged upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.”201 Judge 
McLaughlin stated that although “[f]ive Justices in Jones signed or joined 
concurring opinions suggesting that the precise, pervasive monitoring by the 
government of a person’s location could trigger Fourth Amendment protection 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, at *1–2 (FISA Ct. October 11, 2013), available at www.aclu. 
org/files/assets/2013.10.11_fisa_court_memorandum.pdf. See generally Charlie Savage, N.S.A. 
Plan to Log Calls Is Renewed by Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/20 
13/10/19/us/nsa-plan-to-log-calls-is-renewed-by-court.html. 
 196. In re Application, No. BR 13-158, at *4–5. 
 197. Id. at *4. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Savage, supra note 195. 
 200. In re Application, No. BR 13-158, at *4. 
 201. Id. 
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even without any physical intrusion[,]” the issue presented for her review (i.e., 
the collection of bulk telephone metadata) does not involve such monitoring, 
and, “[l]ike Smith, this case concerns the acquisition of non-content metadata 
other than location information.”202 
She also addressed Judge Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones, which 
provided that “it ‘may be necessary’ for the Supreme Court to ‘reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,’ which [the Associate 
Supreme Court Justice] described as ‘ill suited to the digital age.’”203 Judge 
McLaughlin emphasized in her FISC opinion, however, that the Jones case did 
not actually re-examine the relevancy of the third party doctrine,204 and that 
“Smith remains controlling with respect to the acquisition by the government 
from service providers of non-content telephony metadata.”205 
3. In re Application (March 2014 Opinion) 
On January 3, 2014, the FISC issued an order requiring telecommunication 
entities to produce to the NSA, in bulk and on an ongoing basis, certain 
metadata within their possession.206 On January 22, 2014, a recipient of the 
production order filed a petition with the FISC requesting the court “to vacate, 
modify, or reaffirm” said order in light of the conclusions reached by Judge 
Leon in Klayman.207 According to one commentator, “[t]he petition was the 
first time a telephone company had directly challenged an order to hand over 
phone records in bulk.”208 In response, the U.S. government filed a reply brief 
to the FISC that noted that the FISC, in issuing its original production order, 
did in fact consider Klayman¸ as well as the FISC’s holdings in its August 
 
 202. Id. at *5. See also Allison Grande, FISA Judge Renews NSA Spying, Citing Congress’ 
Support, LAW360 (Oct. 21, 2013, 4:33 PM) (noting that Judge McLaughlin “rejected the 
argument” that the NSA’s telephone metadata collection program “violates the Fourth 
Amendment, finding that the production of metadata on domestic phone calls does not constitute 
a ‘search’ because it does not include the contents of conversations and the data is collected 
directly from a telephone company to which consumers voluntarily disclose their information”). 
 203. In re Application, No. BR 13-158, at *5 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct., 945, 
957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 204. Id. (“The Supreme Court may some day revisit the third-party disclosure principle in the 
context of twenty-first century communications technology, but that day has not arrived.”). 
 205. Id. at *5–6. 
 206. In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
No. BR 14-01, *1 (FISA Ct. March 20, 2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/11489 
29/opinion-and-order-in-case.pdf. 
 207. Id. at *1–2. In accordance with FISA, the recipient of a FISC production order is 
permitted to “challenge the legality of that order” with the FISC. Id. at *1 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 
1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2015); FISC Rule 33(a) (2010)). 
 208. Julian Hattem, Phone Company Fought NSA — and Lost, THE HILL (April 25, 2014, 6:19 
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/204438-phone-company-challenged-nsa-program-lost. 
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2013 and October 2013 decisions, respectively.209 Judge Collyer, writing on 
behalf of the FISC, affirmed the production order and noted that it “remains in 
full force and effect until it expires by its own terms on March 28, 2014,”210 
and discussed at length whether the Fourth Amendment impacts the U.S. 
government’s ability to collect telephone metadata in bulk.211 Judge Collyer’s 
legal analysis can be separated into three sections: (a) a brief discussion on the 
Fourth Amendment and Smith; (b) a review of Judge Leon’s opinion in 
Klayman and an examination on the continuing relevance of Smith; and (c) an 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones.212 In turn, each of these 
issues will be described separately. 
a. Judge Collyer’s Analysis of the Fourth Amendment and Smith 
Prior to engaging in her Fourth Amendment analysis, Judge Collyer noted 
that Judge Leon’s reasoning in Klayman was “unpersuasive” and “provides no 
basis for vacating or muddying” the FISC’s previously issued production 
order.213 Next, Judge Collyer reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith 
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties”214 and stated that “[o]ther courts have 
relied on Smith in concluding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
‘trap and trace’ devices, which function like pen registers but record the 
originating numbers of incoming calls, or to information such as the date, time, 
and duration of calls.”215 Judge Collyer found that the telephone metadata 
information that petitioner provides the NSA in accordance with the 
production order is “indistinguishable in nature from the information at issue in 
Smith and its progeny,”216 and “two judges of this [FISC] . . . and two federal 
 
 209. In re Application, No. BR 14-01, at *3–6. 
 210. Id. at *2. 
 211. Id. at *9–30. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at *9. For opposing viewpoints discussing Judge Collyer’s opinion, compare Stewart 
Baker, Unpersuasive Judicial Punctuation, WASH. POST, April 27, 2014, https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/27/unpersuasive-judicial-punctuation/ with 
Randy Barnett, Another Secret FISA Opinion Disclosed, and a Question for Stewart Baker, 
WASH. POST (April 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/20 
14/04/28/another-secret-fisa-opinion-disclosed-and-a-question-for-stewart-baker/. 
 214. In re Application, No. BR 14-01, at *10. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743–44 (1979). 
 215. Id. at *10–11 (citing United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009); United 
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 216. In re Application, No. BR 14-01 at *11 (The information being provided to the NSA 
includes dialed and incoming telephone numbers and other numbers pertaining to the placing or 
routing of calls, the date, time, and duration of calls; however, it does not include the “contents”). 
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district courts have recently concluded that Smith is controlling with respect to 
the bulk telephony metadata produced to NSA.”217 
b. Judge Collyer’s Analysis of Klayman and the Relevance of Smith 
Thereafter, Judge Collyer addressed the following four arguments raised 
by Judge Leon in Klayman wherein he concluded that Smith does not provide 
adequate guidance in determining whether there is a constitutionally protected 
expectation of privacy in telephone metadata provided to telecommunication 
entities.218 First, Judge Leon asserted that the U.S. government’s telephone 
metadata collection activity in Smith was limited in duration to approximately 
two weeks, and the NSA program, in contrast, involves the U.S. government 
collecting and maintaining five-year’s worth of data and it might continue this 
activity “forever.”219 
Second, Judge Leon argued that, “the relationship between the police and 
the phone company in Smith is nothing compared to the relationship that has 
apparently evolved over the last seven years between the Government and the 
telecom companies,”220 and citizens most likely do not expect that 
telecommunication companies should engage with the NSA in a manner that 
“is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering operation.”221 Third, Judge Leon 
argued that technological advancements permit the U.S. government to collect 
and retain information through means that could not have been “conceived in 
1979” and to do so in a manner that evades the “ordinary checks that constrain 
abusive law enforcement practices.”222 Fourth, Judge Leon found, “most 
importantly,” that “the nature and quantity” of information within telephony 
metadata “is much greater” today than it was at the time of Smith,223 and 
 
 217. Id. at *11–12 (citing ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, WL 6079518, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013); In 
re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 13-158 at *5–6.; In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 
5741573, at *4–5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)). See also Press Release, Director of National 
Intelligence, DOJ and the ODNI Announce the Publication of Additional FISC Filings, Opinions 
and Orders Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the FISA (April 25, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/198-press-releases-2014/1058-doj-and-
the-odni-announce-the-publication-of-additional-fisc-filings,-opinions-and-orders-regarding-col 
lection-under-section-501-of-the-fisa (discussing Judge Collyer’s application of Smith in the bulk 
telephone metadata context) [hereinafter, “Press Release”]. 
 218. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *12–14. 
 219. Id. at *12–13 (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
 220. Id. (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32) (emphasis in original). 
 221. Id. at *5 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33). 
 222. Id. at *13–14 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33). 
 223. Id. at *14 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 34). 
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today’s metadata can “reveal an entire mosaic-a vibrant and constantly 
updating picture of the person’s life.”224 
After putting forth these arguments, Judge Collyer noted that the FISC 
“respectfully disagrees with Judge Leon’s reasons for deviating from 
Smith.”225 In the words of one commentator, Judge Collyer addressed Judge 
Leon’s decision in Klayman and “made short work of it, laying out and 
rejecting each of Judge Leon’s reasons for treating the program as a [F]ourth 
[A]mendment violation.”226 Specifically, Judge Collyer found that Judge 
Leon’s arguments “focused largely on what happens (and what could happen) 
to the telephony metadata after it has been acquired by NSA,”227 and held that 
this focus is misplaced because the third-party principle makes clear that an 
individual “has ‘no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties’ . . . regardless of the disclosing person’s 
assumptions or expectations with respect to what will be done with the 
information following its disclosure.”228 
The individual disclosing the information “assumes the risk of further 
disclosure by the third party”229 and the Court has ruled that it is 
“unreasonable” for him “to expect his . . . records to remain private.”230 Judge 
Collyer relied upon this line of reasoning to conclude the following: 
“If a person who voluntarily discloses information can have no reasonable 
expectation concerning limits on how the recipient will use or handle the 
information, it necessarily follows that he or she also can harbor no such 
expectation with respect to how the Government will use or handle the 
information after it has been divulged by the recipient. Smith itself makes clear 
that once a person has voluntarily conveyed dialing information to the 
telephone company, he forfeits his right to privacy in the information, 
regardless of how it might be later used by the recipient or the Government. 
Accordingly, Judge Leon’s concerns regarding NSA’s retention and analysis of 
the call detail records are irrelevant in determining whether a Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred.”231 
 
 224. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *14 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d 
at 36). 
 225. Id. at *14. 
 226. Baker, supra note 213. 
 227. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *14. 
 228. Id. at *15 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–744 (1979)). 
 229. Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 744). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 17 (internal citations omitted); see generally Charlie Savage, Surveillance Court 
Rules That N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2015 (briefly noting 
that Judge Collyer “rejected Judge Leon’s reasoning” in Klayman and “permitted the [telephone 
metadata collection] program to keep going”). 
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Next, Judge Collyer found that “[f]or the same reason, Judge Leon’s 
assertions regarding citizens’ expectations with respect to the ‘relationship . . . 
between the Government and the telecom companies,’ also provide no basis 
for departing from Smith.”232 According to Judge Collyer, Smith and other 
judicial precedent on the third party doctrine provides that “any such 
expectations or assumptions on the part of telephone users who have disclosed 
their dialing information to the phone company have no bearing on the 
question whether a search has occurred.”233 
Further, Judge Collyer dismissed Judge Leon’s reasoning that the “nature 
and quantity” of telephone metadata today serves as a basis for deviating from 
Smith.234 Here, Judge Collyer focused on the incongruity within Judge Leon’s 
argument wherein he asserts that telephone’s today, unlike at the time of Smith, 
serve as “‘multi-purpose devices’ that can be used to access Internet content, 
and as maps, music players, cameras, text messaging devices,”235 but 
simultaneously acknowledges that the type of information acquired by the U.S. 
government here is limited in scope, such as to the telephone numbers dialed, 
the length of the call, and the date and time of the call.236 Therefore, according 
to Judge Collyer, none of the additional functions equipped on today’s phones 
generate information that the U.S. government is collecting as part of the 
FISC’s production order, and such changes in telephone technology are 
“irrelevant” to the Fourth Amendment analysis.237 
Thereafter, Judge Collyer indicated that Judge Leon’s “repeated 
emphasi[s] [on] the total quantity of telephony metadata obtained and retained 
by NSA” was “misplaced under settled Supreme Court precedent.”238 
According to the FISC Judge, given that Fourth Amendment rights are 
“personal rights” that “may not be vicariously asserted,” the “aggregate scope 
of the collection and the overall size of NSA’s database are immaterial in 
assessing whether any person’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been 
 
 232. Id. (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
 233. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *18 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 744); see 
Press Release, supra note 217 (noting that Judge Collyer found that Judge Leon’s opinion in 
Klayman “was unpersuasive [and] provided no basis for vacating the production order,” and “that 
[Smith] is the controlling precedent”). 
 234. Id. at *18. 
 235. Id. at *18–19 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 34, 36). 
 236. Id. at *18. 
 237. Id. at *19; see Kerr, supra note 111 (arguing that changes in cell phone technology does 
not alter the Fourth Amendment analysis in the context described herein because the information 
the U.S. government collects as part of the telephone metadata program is substantially similar to 
the types of information collected in Smith). 
 238. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, at *19–20. 
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violated. . . . .”239 “The pertinent question,” according to Judge Collyer, is 
“whether a particular user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
telephony metadata associated with his or her own calls”240 and in determining 
whether a search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
“it is irrelevant that other users’ information is also being collected and that the 
aggregate amount acquired is very large.”241 
According to Judge Collyer, “time and technology” have not affected 
Supreme Court precedent, and the government’s collection program under 
review is less intrusive then the one the government reviewed in Miller, which 
was the principal case relied upon in Smith.242 In Miller, the Supreme Court 
held that a bank customer did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
bank records that provided to police investigators pursuant to a subpoena and 
included checks, deposit slips, monthly statements and financial statements for 
a span of over three months.243 The Court found that the bank records 
“contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed 
to their employees in the ordinary course of business”244 and that “[t]he 
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information 
will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”245 According to Judge 
Collyer, “[i]t is far from clear to this Court that even years’ worth of non-
content call detail records would reveal more of the details about a telephone 
user’s personal life than several months’ worth of the same person’s bank 
records.”246 
“[B]ank records,” according to the Judge, “are likely to provide the 
Government directly with detailed information about a customer’s personal 
life,”247 such as the identities of the individuals with whom the customer has 
had financial relationships, the sources of his personal income, the amounts 
and detailed types of his personal expenses, the charities and political 
organizations he supports through financial donations – all of which is 
 
 239. Id. at *20 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978); Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)); see also White Paper, supra note 23, at 20 (noting that the volume of 
records collected by the U.S. government does not alter its Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 240. In re Application of the F.B.I, No. BR 14-01, at *20. 
 241. Id. See Charlie Savage, Phone Company Bid to Keep Data From N.S.A. Is Rejected, 
N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2014) (“Judge Collyer said the Supreme Court precedent was still valid 
and that the bulk nature of the collection was irrelevant because what mattered was each 
individual caller’s expectation of privacy.”). 
 242. In re Application of the F.B.I, No. BR 14-01, at *21, 23. 
 243. Id. at *21 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 448 (1976)); see generally 
Kerr, supra note 52, at 578–79 (discussing Miller and the third party doctrine). 
 244. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *21 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442). 
 245. Id. at *21 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 433). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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information “that call detail records simply do not, by themselves, provide.”248 
Separately, Judge Collyer reasoned that the Miller decision, which was 
published in 1976, “substantially undermines Judge Leon's conclusion that 
Smith does not apply to the NSA telephony metadata program because the 
metadata from each person’s phone reveals so much about a person ‘that could 
not have been gleaned from a data collection in 1979,’ when Smith was 
decided.”249 The Judge found that “[m]any more personal details” could be 
uncovered from bank records such as the ones approved by the Miller Court 
without raising expectation of privacy concerns.250 
c. Judge Collyer’s Analysis of Jones 
After addressing the aforementioned arguments raised by Judge Leon in 
Klayman, Judge Collyer turned to the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jones altered whether there is a constitutionally protected 
expectation of privacy in telephone metadata.251 She noted that the Supreme 
Court’s holding therein rested on the fact that the U.S. government obtained 
the information in question through a physical intrusion on the defendant’s 
vehicle, which the Court viewed as a constitutionally-protected area.252 Judge 
Collyer emphasized that the Supreme Court cited Smith “only in passing” in 
the Jones case.253 
She also noted that although there are two concurring opinions in Jones 
that address privacy issues, “they suggest distinct analytical approaches and 
thus can hardly be read as having adopted a single, coherent principle or 
methodology for lower courts to apply.”254 First, with regard to Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, the Associate Justice’s opinion focused on 
whether police conduct collected so much personal information on an 
individual that it enabled law enforcement to learn about a person’s private 
affairs at any given time.255 Second, Justice Alito’s opinion framed the issue as 
whether the police investigation at issue exceeded society’s expectations for 
how law enforcement personnel would in fact investigate a particular crime.256 
Judge Collyer emphasized that Justice Alito’s concurrence, to which three 
 
 248. Id. at *21–22. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at *22; but see Barnett, supra note 213 (criticizing the analogy to bank records, as 
described in Miller, in the telephone metadata context). 
 251. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *24. 
 252. Id. at *25 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 953 (2012)). 
 253. Id. at. *26 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950). 
 254. Id. at *26–27. 
 255. Id. at *27 (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 311, 328 (Dec. 2012)). 
 256. Id. (citing Kerr, supra note 255, at 328). 
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other Justices joined, does not even mention Smith.257 Also, she stated the 
distinct approaches taken in the concurring opinions “undercut Judge Leon’s 
suggestion that the five concurring Justices in Jones can be viewed as a de 
facto majority on the issue.”258 
Judge Collyer reiterated that although Justice Sotomayor stated in her 
concurrence “that ‘it may be necessary to reconsider” the third-party disclosure 
principle applied in Smith and Miller, which she described as ‘ill suited to the 
digital age,’ she expressly stated that it was unnecessary for the Court to 
undertake such a reexamination in Jones.”259 Thus, “[w]hile the concurring 
opinions in Jones may signal that some or even most of the Justices are ready 
to revisit certain settled Fourth Amendment principles, the decision in Jones 
itself breaks no new ground concerning the third-party disclosure doctrine 
generally or Smith specifically.”260 
4. In re Application (June 2015 Opinion) 
In June of 2015, Judge Mosman, writing on behalf of the FISC, addressed 
whether to approve an application by the FBI requiring the production of 
certain telephone metadata in light of the recently-enacted USA FREEDOM 
Act.261 Judge Mosman found that the FISC was authorized to approve such 
requests, at least for an interim period of 180-days until certain provisions 
within the USA FREEDOM Act that ended the government’s bulk collection 
of telephone metadata went into effect.262 According to one commentator, the 
180-day transition period was “baked into” the law “to allow the NSA time to 
switch over to a more limited and targeted surveillance regime.”263 
Prior to reviewing whether the bulk telephone metadata collection program 
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, Judge Mosman analyzed the 
underlying statutory authority for the U.S. government to request and collect 
 
 257. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *27–28. 
 258. Id. at *27 (citing Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)); United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 259. In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01 at *28 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 260. Id. at *30. Judge Collyer also stated, “[t]he concurring opinions notwithstanding, Jones 
simply cannot be read as inviting the lower courts to rewrite Fourth Amendment law in this area.” 
Id. 
 261. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
No. BR 15-75, at *1 (FISC Ct. June 29, 2015) (internal citations omitted). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Dustin Volz, Court Revives Defunct NSA Mass Surveillance Program, Nat’l J. (June 30, 
2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/24869/court-revives-defunct-nsa-mass-surveillance-pro 
gram; see also Statement by the ODNI on Retention of Data Collected Under Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, IC on the Rec. (July 27, 2015) (discussing how the U.S. government will 
retain and access telephone metadata previously collected in accordance with Section 215)¸ 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/125179645313/statement-by-the-odni-on-retention-of-data. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BULK TELEPHONE METADATA 41 
the bulk telephone metadata in question.264 Specifically Judge Mosman 
addressed the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Clapper that section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT does not permit the FISC 
to approve applications permitting the U.S. government to collect vast amounts 
of telephone data.265 Specifically, Judge Mosman found that “Second Circuit 
rulings are not binding on the FISC,”266 the FISC “disagrees with the [Second 
Circuit’s] analysis,”267 and “[t]o a considerable extent, the Second Circuit’s 
analysis rests on mischaracterizations of how [the telephone metadata 
collection] program works. . . ”268 The Judge’s opinion led one commentator to 
claim that there was a “cat fight between the FISA court and the 2nd Circuit 
Court of Appeals.”269 
In turning to his Fourth Amendment analysis, Judge Mosman noted that 
“the FISC has repeatedly concluded on numerous occasions that NSA’s 
acquisition of call detail records under the terms set forth in the government’s 
application . . . comports with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.”270 
He then addressed the argument raised by amici that the “differences between 
the present circumstances and Smith in nature and scope are so stark as to 
make Smith inapposite,”271 and responded by holding that the nature of the 
information government receives pursuant to the FISC’s order, which does not 
include any communications content, is “indistinguishable from the 
information at issue in Smith and its progeny.”272 Judge Mosman found, “[a]s 
in Smith, this information is voluntarily conveyed to a telecommunications 
provider when a person places a call, and the provider stores and uses the 
information for billing and other purposes.”273 
The FISC Judge addressed that fact that, unlike in Smith, the government 
was using the FISC’s order to collect “trunk identifiers,” “International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity” numbers, “International Mobile station Equipment 
Identity” numbers and telephone calling card numbers, and ruled that such 
information is still the same type of dialing, signaling, and routing information 
that that does not include communications contents and that telephone users 
provide to telecommunication entities in order to complete routine calls and 
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which is retained for business purposes.274 Judge Mosman found that users of 
such telecommunications services simply have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in this information.275 
Without going into more detail, Judge Mosman dismissed other arguments 
raised by the Movants related to the “nature of the produced call detail 
records” on the grounds that Judge Collyer “previously considered and 
rejected” these arguments.276 Judge Mosman also cited Judge Collyer’s 
opinion as he rejected the attempt “to distinguish this case [from Smith] based 
on the government’s storage and use of the data post-acquisition” because the 
“third-party disclosure principle applies regardless of the disclosing person’s 
assumptions or expectations with respect to what will be done with the 
information following its disclosure.”277 Next, Judge Mosman again relied on 
Judge Collyer’s previous opinion to summarily reject (without more 
explanation) the Movants’ arguments that the FISC should find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the metadata provided to telecommunications entities 
because of “expectations based on their contractual relationships with 
telecommunications providers, the fact that there are more providers to choose 
from than there were in 1979, and . . . that the relationship between the 
government and the providers is different.”278 
Thereafter, Judge Mosman stated that the argument that “the scope of the 
collection justifies departing from Smith” was “equally unavailing.”279 
Specifically, Judge Mosman cited the principle that “Fourth Amendment rights 
‘are personal in nature”’280 to reason that the government’s acquisition of “data 
about many people is immaterial in assessing whether any particular person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated such that a search under 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred.281 “To the extent the quantity of 
metadata is relevant at all, it can only be the quantity of metadata that pertains 
to a particular person,” according to the Judge.282 
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In a separate portion of his analysis, Judge Mosman reiterated the 
Movants’ argument “that a series of statutes enacted after Smith respecting the 
disclosure by telephone companies of information about their customers’ calls 
supports the conclusion that Movants have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the metadata in question” and found that this argument “lacks merit.”283 
According to the FISC Judge, Congress may provide safeguards to personal 
information and regulate how law enforcement personnel access and retain 
such data.284 However, according to the Judge, this type of legal framework is 
statutory (and not constitutional) in nature, and thus does not impact the Fourth 
Amendment’s search and seizure framework.285 The Judge also noted that the 
actual statutes cited by movants “fail” to even support their Fourth Amendment 
argument.286 
Next, Judge Mosman rejected the Movants’ argument that the FISC should 
interpret certain case law to find the third-party disclosure inapplicable to the 
current case, and ruled that “these cases do not reduce the binding authority of 
Smith”287 and that the FISC previously addressed and distinguished several of 
the cases raised by the Movants.288 Next, and just as hastily, the Judge rejected 
the movants argument related to the U.S government’s collection of cell-site 
and GPS location information on the ground that “no such information is 
involved in this case.”289 
Last, Judge Mosman concluded his Fourth Amendment legal analysis by 
addressing the Movant’s argument that the FISC “should find that they have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in call detail records based on the concurring 
opinions in [Jones].”290 The Judge noted that two FISC judges – Judge Collyer 
and Judge McLaughlin – previously heard similar arguments and rejected them 
for lack of merit, respectively, and he “agrees with their analysis.”291 
Specifically, Judge Mosman quoted Judge Collyer’s opinion in support of the 
following proposition: “[w]hile the concurring opinions in Jones may signal 
that some or even most of the Justices are ready to revisit certain settled Fourth 
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Amendment principles, the decision in Jones itself breaks no new ground 
concerning the third-party disclosure doctrine generally or Smith specifically . . 
. ”292 Thus, Judge Mosman found that because Smith was controlling and the 
U.S. government’s collection of telephone metadata in accordance with 
Section 215 did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.293 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The aforementioned cases represent the most recent legal opinions 
discussing whether the Fourth Amendment impacts the U.S. government’s 
ability to collect and retain telephone metadata in bulk. Given the recent 
statutory amendments enumerated in the USA FREEDOM ACT294 and the 
probability that without additional congressional action the U.S. government 
may no longer use Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT295 to collect 
telephone metadata in bulk, the cases discussed herein may become moot and 
dismissed in the near future. Thus, this case law may provide the most relevant 
precedent for years to come on the issue of whether individuals have a 
constitutionality protected reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone 
metadata. 
In discussing this issue, the cases described in Part IV of this article 
primarily focus on whether Smith’s holding that a telephone user does not have 
an expectation of privacy in a limited amount of telephone metadata provided 
to a telephone company is applicable to an exponentially greater volume of the 
same information. As noted above, Judge Leon would seem to answer that 
question in the negative296, as would Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor.297 
According to their opinions described supra, such voluminous amounts of 
telephone metadata reveals deeply personal information and, through the last 
several years, society has come to expect that such private and personal 
information would not be readily available to the U.S. government in a manner 
outside the scope and restrictions enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.298 
However, these arguments have been thoroughly rejected by the FISC and 
have not fared too well in other Article III courts. For example, courts have 
rejected these arguments for the following reasons: an individual should not 
 
 292. Id. at *24–25 (quoting In re Application of the F.B.I., No. 14-01, at *30). 
 293. Id. at *25. 
 294. Pub. L. No. 114–23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). 
 295. See United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, slip op., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 18, 2013); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–14 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Obama, 24 F.Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014); In 
re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13–109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 296. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33. 
 297. See Part IV, infra. 
 298. Id.; Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BULK TELEPHONE METADATA 45 
reasonably expect that information he provides a third party will remain private 
or in confidence of the recipient; the type of information that the U.S. 
government collected pursuant to Section 215, non-content-based information, 
is substantially similar to the information at issue in Smith, which therefore 
should remain controlling; information not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, such as non-content based telephone metadata, does not gain 
such protection simply because one aggregates that information large amounts; 
and the Constitution does not protect other types of information beyond 
telephone metadata that reveals deeply personal information, such as bank 
records, and thus it would not be appropriate to extend the Fourth Amendment 
to telephone metadata provided to third parties.299 
As is clear from the case summary provided herein, the judges addressing 
this very difficult constitutional issue put forth valid and respectable arguments 
in which one can reasonable and ethically agree or disagree. However, as 
noted, this issue may not be resolved by the Supreme Court in the near term, 
and it will be lawyers and practitioners that will need to rely on this case law in 
developing their own arguments regarding the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment as similar national security programs that are developed in the 
future. 
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